The neocons are really outdoing themselves now. Having bogged the United States down in an increasingly dangerous quagmire in Iraq, they may be setting the stage for military conflict in Korea.
Their strategy is a little difficult to explain. Like the old "logic" of nuclear deterrence, it seems to turn rationality on its head. But let's start with this headline in today's New York Times:
U.S. Pushing Realignment of Troops in South Korea
CAMP GREAVES, South Korea, June 1 -- Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz signaled United States determination today to realign combat forces in South Korea . . .
Mr. Wolfowitz, visiting the forwardmost United States infantry battalion in South Korea, warned, “The North Koreans won’t stand still, and we can’t stand still either,” when asked about pulling the entire Second Infantry Division off the main invasion route from North Korea.
Mr. Wolfowitz indicated he hoped to convince reluctant South Korean leaders that American troops should withdraw south of Seoul in a major overhaul of the United States military presence in the region.
“We believe there are adjustments and realignments that will give us a stronger deterrent,” said Mr. Wolfowitz, viewed as an advocate of a tough military stance against North Korea.
But deterrence has nothing to do with it. In fact, deterrence is what Field Marshall Wolfowitz apparently wants to destroy -- the same deterrence that has maintained an uneasy truce on the Korean peninsula since 1953.
Top Down
Wolfowitz isn't the first member of the Pentagon junta to raise the redeployment issue. Several weeks before the Iraq invasion, Donald Rumsfeld made much the same point in a talk with Dod civilian employees. Here's what the Donald said:
We still have a lot of forces in Korea arranged very far forward, where it's intrusive in their lives, and where they really aren't very flexible or usable for other things . . . And we of course have comparative advantages with respect to an air hub or a sea hub and reinforcement. So we . . . look at how we might rebalance our relationship and our force structure.
Now I know this all sounds like the usual Pentagonspeak -- the hardest and ugliest dialect in the bureaucratic family of languages -- but it has huge implications for our policy in Korea. To put it bluntly, it could mean war. Maybe not now, but maybe not that far down the road, either.
The Human Trip Wire
To understand why, you have understand a little bit about our current policy in Korea. The United States currently keeps part of a division -- the 2nd Division, permanently stationed in Korea -- on the edge of the Demilitarized Zone with North Korea, mostly in and around the city of Seoul.
These 13,000 troops are there for one reason: to serve as a human trip wire in the event of a North Korean invasion. They have one mission: to be killed, wounded or taken prisoner by the North Koreans.
Gen. Patton -- or rather, George C. Scott playing Gen. Patton -- once said the objective in war isn't to die for your country, but to make the other poor SOB for his. So why have we put 13,000 U.S. soldiers out as doormats for an invading North Korean army?
As a deterrent. In the loopy logic of the Cold War, this actually made sense. Knowing an attack would annihilate US front line forces, the North Koreans (and more importantly, their Soviet patrons) would understand that our response would be a nuclear -- maybe tactical, maybe strategic, maybe both. Wishing to avoid World War III, the Soviets would make damned certain the North Koreans stayed in their box.
Of course, this deterrent rested on two assumptions: We don't want to invade the North, and the North Koreans don't have their own nukes. And the last assumption isn't the only one that may no longer be correct.
The Best Offense is a Good Defense
What Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz are proposing is to move 2nd Division's forward elements back from the DMZ, and redeploy them closer to our port and air bases further south. In the event of war, these troops could be quickly reinforced by troops flown in from Okinawa, Hawaii or the United States.
That, at least, is the cover story. And at first glance, it might seem like a step back from the edge of the cliff. If thousands of US soldiers are no longer automatic casualties in the event of a North Korean invasion, the Pentagon might have room to look at non-nuclear options, like establishing a defense line south of Seoul and trying to hold there until our conventional forces could be built up enough to launch a counter offensive.
This, roughly, is what we did in Korean War I, when the intiial North Korean attack pushed us all the way back to the port of Pusan in the far south. McArthur held them there, then landed at Inchon and recaptured Seoul. Most of the invading forces were cut off and destroyed.
But by speaking publicly about moving US troops in Korea back from the DMZ, the Bush administration could be setting the stage for war in Korea. That's because any move back from the DMZ may give the North Koreans the idea that we are preparing to fight, and win, a conventional war on the peninsula.
That's a leap, I know, but look at it from North Korea's point of view. They know the administration is committed to a policy of preemptive war. And they know that the administration has refused to rule out military action in Korea. And even if the administration did say it, the North Koreans probably wouldn't believe it. Would you?
But the North Koreans also understand -- as does the Pentagon -- that a military build up for an invasion of the North would take time -- at least 3-to-6 months, and probably much more now, given that the bulk of our forces are now tied down in Iraq.
Cannon Fodder
As things currently stand, the North Koreans have their own deterrent -- several actually. The first is those 13,000 U.S. troops sitting out on the human trip wire. The second are the thousands of North Korean artillery pieces sitting just outside the DMZ -- about 30 miles north of Seoul. They are there to make sure that the Pentagon understands that any offensive action against the North would result in the immediate destruction of most of downtown Seoul.
This is the balance of terror at its finest.
If U.S. forces are pulled back south of Seoul, though, it could suggest to the North Koreans that we no longer care about the city -- or at least, that we're willing to risk its destruction in the event of war. (The neocons have floated the idea that U.S. long-range artillery and air strikes to could take out the North Korean guns before they do too much damage. File it in the wishful thinking folder.)
The North Koreans might see redeployment as a signal that we're willing to sacrifice Seoul in order to establish a defense line further south, one that could be held in the event of of North Korean invasion while we pummel their attacking forces with air power and build up our land forces for a counterattack.
So now the North Koreans have lost all their deterrents -- the human trip wire is gone; we're signalling that we're willing to sacrifice Seoul; and their existing nuclear weapons probably are not small enough to deliver with their existing missiles.
Even Paranoids Have Real Enemies
If the North Korean military are thinking in these terms (and given that they're some of the most paranoid people on the planet, there's no reason to think they aren't) they may see themselves as having two choices: continue their crash nuclear program, in hopes of having usable nukes before the US can invade, or attack now, or soon, before the Pentagon can redeploy its forces, and while the U.S. is still bogged down in Iraq.
Now the U.S. and South Korea might be able to stop a North Korean invasion, assuming the Pentagon had lots of air power in the region to throw at it. But the North couldn't be stopped short of Seoul -- not without going nuclear almost immediately. Or at least, that's been the Pentagon's judgment in the past.
Now this doesn't necessarily mean the administration actually intends to invade the North. The Pentagon might pull back because it realizes that if North Korea will soon have usable nukes, even a few of them, then the U.S. threat to go nuclear just as soon as they cross the DMZ is no longer credible. The hawks may have concluded that if we're going to defend the South at all, it's going to have to be somewhere south of Seoul. Maybe that's what Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz have in mind.
But the North Koreans can't be sure. Because if the U.S. wanted to build up its forces for an invasion of the North, or if the administration wanted to strike at their nuclear facilities with air power, it would do the same thing -- pull back to more defensible positions to meet a conventional attack.
Why? Because we would know that any build up of our forces in Korea for an invasion of the North would be detected. We would also know that the North's logical response would be to attack first, before our forces were in place -- to use their conventional deterrent while they still have it. So we would have to be prepared to meet that attack.
Likewise, if the administration was going to hit the North's nuclear facilities, it would also pull our forces back, and for the same reason: to be able to defend against an conventional response. But if the North Koreans see us pulling back, or even hear us talking about pulling back, they might assume that we're getting ready to hit their nuclear facilities. Again, they might conclude they have to invade first, before we are ready for them.
Silence is Golden
I know this is a whole lot of mights and coulds, but that's what deterrence is all about. You can't know your enemies true intentions -- only his capabilities. So you try to understand how the other side could interpret and respond to your actions.
The bottom line, I think, is that anything that makes North Korea think the United States is preparing to reposition our forces to fight and win a war on the Korean peninsula is potentially destabilizing. It could lead them to react in kind -- especially now that the administration has made preemptive war a doctrine.
Kim Jong Il has no way to be sure that what applies to Saddam doesn't apply to him. He has to assume the worst. And because he has to assume the worst, we do, too.
Which means the less Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz say about redeploying U.S. forces in Korea, the better.
Update 6/2: So much for that advice:
U.S. Sees Changes in Frontline Forces in Korea
A senior defense official said U.S. plans to transform allied forces at the demilitarized zone would be aimed ensuring U.S. and South Korean forces could begin "taking down" the North's heavily fortified frontline from the first hour of a war.
General Leon Laporte, commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, was working on a plan which was "quite a transformation in the way both our countries would be postured," the official said.
"While we can't completely compensate for the fact that North Korea has so much stuff right up forward on the DMZ, we could begin taking it down from the first hour of the war and that would make a big difference," the official said.
"It would save lives and ultimately it has to strengthen deterrence."
The official said that the present U.S. military posture at the border "sacrifices a good deal of military capability for the symbolism of having some American soldiers on the DMZ.
"It means if North Korea were to attack we would spend a lot of the first period of time ... reorganizing and regrouping in order to start hitting back," he added.
I realize the U.S. Army now has God-like powers, but I'm not aware of any source (other than our anonymous Wolfowitz here) who believes a North Korean invasion of South Korea could be stopped -- much less "taken down" -- at the DMZ by conventional means. If someone has evidence to the contrary, I'd like to see it.
But, if I'm right -- that U.S. doctrine calls for a nuclear, not a conventional, response to a North Korean invasion -- then the smokescreen about "improving deterrence" becomes a little transparent. Which is why these paragraphs are the ones to key in on:
Other U.S. officials said under plans now being developed U.S. and South Korean forces would be consolidated in two general areas away from the DMZ and would be more threatening to the North.
In event of a war, these forces could skirt the DKZ and head straight for Pyongyang and the North Korean leadership, much like U.S.-led forces headed straight for Baghdad in the war in Iraq.
"This is (North Korean leader) Kim Jong-il's worst nightmare," one official said.
Let's just hope Kim Jong Il doesn't decide to make it our worst nightmare first.
Interesting analysis of the many possible varied moves in this scary chess match with two nuclear powers. A very precariuos situation.
Wholeheartedly agree your conclusion.
Wish Rummy, Wolfowitz et al would adhere to the golden rule "silence is golden". Still wondering why the DOD appears to be "running" the diplomatic efforts with this.
I have always felt that the most powerful and dangerous man in the world right now is Donald Rumsfeld...and to think he was never even elected into his position of power.
Again you hit the nail on the head. This post seems familiar--didn't you have a similar post back on the DailyKos, or am I having a deja vu attack.
I thought the redeployment had been squashed by the State Department prior to South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun recent visit since with the US troops gone from the DMZ the only hostage to the North Korean artillery would be Seoul. I guess Wolfowitz didn’t get the message. The preemptively bombing of North Korea’s nuclear sites with no American troop casualties is just too vital to the neo-conservatives. If the North Korea’s flatten Seoul, so what. No more nuclear threat to the USA.
Shit. Busted. Yeah, I plagiarized myself, because I think this is potentially the most disasterous stunt the neocons have pulled yet, and Wolfowitz gave me a hook to retell the story.
I also didn't think many people would remember the first one.
I thought the redeployment had been squashed by the State Department prior to South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun recent visit
Joe Galloway has the story here. Rumsfeld wanted to send Wolfowitz to S. Korea to announce the redeployment as a done deal -- without even bothering to tell our South Korean "allies."
State managed to shoot that idea down, but apparently Rummy and the Wolfman decided to talk the idea up anyway. Just their way of saying "fuck you" to Colin Powell, I guess.
Let's see - Afghanistan, Iraq, (Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Lybia, Sudan, Djibouti, ...)
Doesn't leave much for North Korea. Myabe BushCo is thinking of drafting people without jobs?
One other serious problem with our scenario here- according to Global Security.org, the US will have a grand total of TWO carriers at sea in the entire world once the USS Constellation arrives at San Diego tomorrow (Nimitz and Vinson). No other carrier will be ready for a mission until this autumn at least, when the Stennis will apparently be ready. Where's that air power going to come from?
One other serious problem with our scenario here- according to Global Security.org, the US will have a grand total of TWO carriers at sea in the entire world once the USS Constellation arrives at San Diego tomorrow
As I've said before, let's just hope that Kim Il Jong sticks to the porno sites when he surfs the web . . .
A quite chilling aspect of your brilliant deconstruction Billmon, is that the neo-cons know full well the solution. Perhaps this is the reason behind the public floating of the idea of "tactical nukes". Plant the idea. Idea mainstreams. Feign disgust at a war in which nukes must be used. Implement fog of war propaganda. Nuke NK. Let the fog and radioactive dust settle a few weeks. Implanted simultaneous revulsion and acceptance (you know, when nature calls, you gotta do what you gotta do) of the use of nukes sets in and they've gotten away with yet another lie of cataclysmic proportions.
Tactical Nukes. Look how obscure the "Gulf War Syndrome" is still treated in front of the public eye. The cancers and birth deformations on the Canadian and American west coasts will similarly be pooh-poohed and flushed down the memory hole.
Just a thought.
With all due respect to Billmon, I'm hesitant to believe anyone has an insight to how the North Koreans will react to this situation. I pretty much guessed how the Iraq situation would go, at every turn, starting all the way back in January when I first started paying attention. The N. Koreans, OTOH, have baffled me on every turn.
The characterization of backing up as "defensible position" isn't really accurate, though. Given the cellular operations shown in the Iraqi invasion, with response times heightened by networked communications, it's actually an extremely *aggressive* position to be in. That probably only helps your argument, though. Assuming we can guess what N. Korea is thinking.
That such aggressive posturing is becoming the currency of Bush "diplomacy" is truly frightening. No doubt the ROK government will be consulted in advance just before the JDAMS, Cruise missiles, tac-nukes, or whatever else Rummy has planned for the DRNK are launched...at least to give President Roh Moo Hyun and his administration time to flee south before Seoul is incinerated by the totality of North Korean artillery. Think about it...over 150000 troops stuck in Iraq, major refits and replenishing required for US munition stocks, Iran being threatened yet again, and...war talk on the Korean Peninsula. I'm afraid we've seen the future of where neoconism is taking us, which is to turn the world upside down, shake well, and hope it'll all come right in the end.
The neocon's dream is America's nightmare...
The ultimate expression of American power is the use of nuclear weapons, but where and when to use them? We missed the opportunity in Iraq when those dirty Iraqis refused to tempt us by shooting at our troops with their vaunted arsenal of WMDs. Those guys just didn't fight fair, and now there is a hugely embarassing problem for the administration to explain to us citizens all the other reasons for waging aggressive war since the main reason for doing seems to have disappeared before the neocons very eyes...
This might be a stretch, but what if the theory of moving our troops to Southern SK is to invite a first strike from the paranoid (ok maybe his fears are based in reality) and highly unstable North Korean leader. If Kim Jong Il strikes because he believes he has a limited window of opportunity to win, then the neocons get their win-win scenario. They win because public attention moves away from Iraq towards that dastardly WMDs possessing leader of another broken country, and they win because they get to provide the ultimate nuclear example to the world of what happens when you mess with America. How do you respond to a sustained 175mm chemical laden howitzer barrage on Seoul? Why you tactically nuke the bastards. Of course, tactical nukes is a term that brings to mind limited death and destruction and makes the use of such weapons far easier to swallow for the American public, but the reality is that a tactical nuke can cause as much destruction as was done to Hiroshima if say dropped on Pyonhyang in an attempt to decapitate the NK leadership...
Frankly, I believe (and am accordingly appalled that I believe this) that the Bush Administration is capable of sacrificing millions of Koreans to avoid an embarrassing domestic situation, and I think they want to demonstrate to the world in the most naked, aggressive, and extreme facet of the New American Century. It's kind of like the huge tax breaks being the back door method of 'starving the beast' and gutting Social Security and Medicare because they don't have the votes to do so upfront, only in this case the road we're being taken for a ride upon is a one-way high speed express sorry ma'am no stops allowed to a bleak and terrible future. If this scenario comes to pass, any future President of either party will be forced to continue the aggressive national posture begun by Gods chosen current occupant of the Oval Office. Afterall, once we prove to the world that WE are the clear and present danger, the realignment towards bipolarity that began with Iraq finds a new urgency in the capitals of the civilized world...
As I've remarked several times to friends recently:
"Hmmm, If your civilian defense secretary takes over the government, is that considered a military coup?"
I only wish I was joking...
I must admit I hadn't fully considered this Dr Strangelove proposition.
I am a teacher in the RoK at present, and I've spent many hours talking over these sorts of scenaria with Koreans. One thing I can confirm is the "tripwire" role of the troops at the DMZ - although I would add that it extends to Korean soldiers as well as Americans. As part of their compulsory military training, soldiers in the RoK are taught that if stationed on the DMZ, their job is to delay the enemy for FIVE MINUTES AT ANY COST. This really does underline the tension here.
I've got a bunch of other things to say about this; I have to work now, but I'll post later.
Cheers,
L
Louis -- I'd definitely like to hear more.
I'm not sure if this is newsworthy outside Korea, but the withdrawal of US troops from Yongsan is part of a set of reforms, including phase-outs, relocations, etc, being argued about both by US military and the RoK. It's not squarely a Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz Executive Decision (tm). The place location of the USFK garrison is a site of some historical significance and many Koreans resent such a strong military presence in the heart of the capital. There has been a good deal of public protest about the garrison of late, and now the idea is to allow the RoK to shoulder more of the defense burden, particularly at the front lines. The people of the RoK sort of want to have their cake and eat it, too - they want to have the support and protection of the US military, but they want to remain the ranking authority on all things martial. Plenty of ordinary Koreans want the US to radically scale back or even withdraw their military presence here, although the government is absolutely not going to let that happen.
Is this a destabilising influence? Undoubtedly. Anytime you the ordinary people of a country feel lukewarm about a foreign miliary force on their soil you have potential trouble. Any time you pick up 20-odd thousand soldiers and relocate them, you're going to get teething problems and logistical hiccups. Is an apparent retreat something that would be recommended in an area as tense as the DMZ? Generally not. But what it boils down to is what you think of the DPRK.
There's a very distinctive way in which Korean perception of this situation differs from the rest of the world, and it's something I didn't realise until I came here, because it doesn't get any media coverage. South Koreans regard Korea as one nation, temporarily divided into two arbitrary halves. This is fair enough when you consider they've been culturally distinct from the Chinese and Japanese for about 5000 years and have weathered hundreds of invasions, occupations and divisions. This really is just the most recent in a long line of troubles.
The net effect of all this is that your ordinary Korean on the street does not believe that the North would invade. But, you say, they did once before! Things were different in the 1950s. Communism was much stronger, ideologically and infrastructurally than it is now. North Korea had an absolutely overwhelming military advantage in terms of the size and effectiveness of its army. It had the benefit of surprise, and it had troops, equipment and logistical support from Russia, and China.
Now, with the tables turned, I think an invasion is unlikely. Kim Jong-il may be erratic, but he's not completely blind, and while he barks a lot he's not known for his bite. He also remembers who won the first Korean war. His primary objective, though he won't admit it, is securing food and energy for his starving, freezing country. He may have nukes, but even that's uncertain. Scientists here reckon that if the Yongbyon reactor really HAD been reprocessing fissile material, changes in the proportions of various atmospheric gases, etc, would be apparent. They're not.
While I think Billmon's right about his analysis of US bait-and-switch intentions, I don't think it'll pan out that way. The thing that both South and North fear most is another war. Neither side has anything to gain from it: a nuke in Seoul would kill millions in minutes and utterly destroy the country's infrastructure. A full-scale conventional bombardment could kill ten thousand in the first few hours. There is no secret that the reprisal would be swift and sure, and that the war would pretty much be over before it really began.
I think a more likely proposition, and one that many Koreans believe, is that the US will eventually invade the DPRK on siimilar grounds to Iraq. The skittles are set up as follows, according to a group of my adult students: Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Korea.
I guess we'll see. Any comments?
L
Louis -- Thanks for your insightful comments.
I understand there are many wheels in motion here, and I realize that, as you say, Kim Jong-il's bark (if indeed he's the one in the Hermit Kingdom doing the barking) is worse than his bite.
I also don't think he has aggressive designs on the South, but, as you know, it's hard to tell what the other power centers in the North (like the generals) think about these things. This is, so to speak, not his father's dictatorship, and as far as I can tell it's still very hard to how much power Kim really has. It doesn't appear to be absolute.
My main point, though, is not that while the North probably wouldn't invade as a first resort, it might invade as a last resort -- IF the North Koreans decided the Americans were quietly positioning themselves for a conventional war.
I may be wrong about this, but given the neocons' track record, I'd rather they didn't put it to the test.
Thanks again for the info.
This is the danger of having Wolfowitz go to Korea to bluster and threaten. Him and Rummy -- they are definitely the types of people on which Dr. Strangelove was modeled.
Gee, the possibility of a nuclear war before the next election. What will they think of next to "build a better world"? No wonder the rest of the world thinks Bush is scarier than the petty dictators around the world.