After months of vacillation, Bureaucrat Man -- aka Imperial Viceroy Jerry Bremer -- has decided to accept the creation of a new Iraqi paramilitary force, to be cobbled together by the five major political factions represented on the "Governing" Council:
U.S. Shifts On Creation Of Security Unit in Iraq
The U.S. administrator of Iraq has decided to conditionally support the creation of an Iraqi-led paramilitary force composed of former employees of the country's security services and members of political party militias, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials.Iraq's U.S.-appointed Governing Council wants the force, which would pursue resistance fighters who have eluded American troops, to include a domestic intelligence-gathering unit and to have broad powers to conduct raids and interrogate suspects.
This idea has been kicking around since the August bombings of the UN headquarters in Baghdad and the Ayatollah Hakim in Najaf. But up until now, each time the Governing Council kicked it towards the Coalition, Team Bremer booted it back at them. The Americans insisted that control of security operations had to remain in American hands -- with the Iraqi police filling the role formerly played by Don Knotts on the old Andy Griffith Show.
Amazing what a few mortar rounds can do. Or, as the Washington Post quotes one unnamed coalition official:
"It would be good to have a group of Iraqis who are well-trained and well-armed and well-disciplined participating in the fight," one occupation authority official said. "Every bit helps."
Translation: We'd like a well-trained, well-disciplined force, but if all we can get is a bunch of political thugs toting AK-47s, we'll take it. Beggars can't be choosy.
Time to Lose
To be sure, Team Bremer is promising to proceed with care -- the same high degree of care, no doubt, that the Pentagon showed in its pre-war planning for the occupation. But care (vetting recruits, keeping the various factions from carving out their own fiefdoms, etc.) takes time, and time is one of the many things the Coalition doesn't have.
Officially, the Coaltion's wariness about the use of paramilitary forces -- at least until now -- has stemmed from fears the plan would institutionalize the strong sectarian tendencies within the embryonic Iraqi government.
The major ethnic/religious factions represented on the Governing Council (Kurdish, Sunni, Sh'ia, Turkoman, etc.) already have divided up the various government ministries largely along sectarian lines. Extending that same spoils system to the armed forces could cause all kinds of trouble down the road -- especially if the division of spoils becomes a less amicable process.
This is what happened in Lebanon in the 1970s, when the rise of a Shi'a majority plurality finally upended a delicate constitutional balance in which specific posts were reserved for specific religious communities -- the presidency to the Christians, the prime ministership to the Sunnis, etc. When this power-sharing arrangement fell apart, so did the Lebanese Army, providing each faction with the men and the arms it needed to form its own private militia.
Iraq's New Model Army -- the force currently being built by the Americans from the ground up -- was supposed to be the antidote to the threat of creeping Lebanization. But events seem to have passed that plan by, just as they've bypassed so many of the quaint assumptions (rose petals thrown at tanks, Jeffersonian Democrats springing out of the woodwork, oil revenues gushing out of the ground) that the Americans brought with them to Iraq.
State Within a State?
Long before the New Model Army is a functioning force, the Not-So-Model Paramilitary Army probably will have already filled its place as the centerweight of the new regime. As the Post notes, it will -- at least in theory -- be the most powerful domestic security force in the country the moment it is created. It will have its own intelligence arm, run its own counterinsurgency operations, and have a direct line (numerous lines, actually) to its political patrons on the Governing Council.
This description bears more than a passing resemblence to the state-within-a-state the Ba'ath Party managed to build in Iraq, in which the party had its very own army (the Republican Guard) and its very own intelligence service (the Mukhabarat).
As the Post story somewhat delicately notes, this simularity is "fueling concern among some U.S. officials that [the paramilitary force] could be used for undemocratic purposes, such as stifling political dissent, as such forces do in other Arab nations."
It's true that having a functioning Baathist-style security apparatus would greatly solidify the power grip of the five factions that currently dominate the Governing Council. These are:
- The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq -- the largest Shi'a faction and the one most closely aligned with Iran
- The two Kurdish main parties -- Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
- The two main "secular" exile groups -- Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress and the more shadowy Iraqi National Accord.
That last group, the Iraq National Accord, or INA, appears to be in a particularly favorable position. In the great carve up of government ministries that followed the appointment of the Governing Council back in June, the INA ended up in charge of the Interior Ministry, which already controls the national police and the soon-to-be-created civil defense force. It appears likely the new paramilitary force will fall under the ministry's purview as well.
The INA's leader, Iyad Alawi (or Allawi) just finished his first turn as one of the Governing Council's rotating presidents. But he kept his full-time gig: chairman of the council's security subcommittee. On paper, Alawi looks like a logical candidate to become Iraq's neo-Ba'athist security strongman, since he was also a paleo-Ba'athist security strongman. A Ba'ath Party member and former Iraqi intelligence officer (I haven't been able to find out whether it was in the Mukhabarat or one of the other services), Alawi defected in 1971, and formed the INA in 1990.
The INA's membership consists almost entirely of former military and intelligence officers who defected from Saddam's ranks. Alawi himself is Shi'ite, but the INA itself is largely Sunni -- which isn't surprising, given the composition of the Ba'ath and the old Iraqi Army. Who better to form the core of a new "Saddam Lite" police state?
As always, though, the personal is also the political. The INA has had a long and uneasy relationship with Chalabi's INC -- a rivalry that in turn reflects the equally uneasy relationship between the CIA and the Pentagon.
You may know the gist of the story already: Early in the Clinton administration, the CIA and the State Department adopted the INC as their chosen Iraqi exile organization. But they later switched to the National Accord, which -- with its Mukhabarat and Iraqi Army contacts -- seemed more capable of pulling off a coup that would rid them of Saddam but leave the shell of the Ba'athist state intact. The Saudis, who hated and distrusted the INC and very much wanted to preserve a Sunni-controlled Iraq, particularly liked this idea.
By the summer of 1995, Alawi had convinced his American handlers a coup was doable. But the operation was the usual CIA-run comedy of errors. Saddam's men quickly and thoroughly penetrated the INA's networks. In June 1996 they rolled them up -- then used the same clandestine communications system the CIA had given to the plotters to notify the INA's case officer that the game was over.
The CIA hung on to the National Accord, perhaps on the theory that an exile organization run by an incompentent spook is still better than one run by an corrupt banker. The neocons, on the other hand, emerged from the botched coup more convinced then ever that Chalabi was the man -- a conviction they put into force just as soon as they regained control of the Pentagon.
From to Baghdad
I mention this pathetic story only to emphasize that the last thing the Coalition should be worrying about right now is the risk the Governing Council's new paramilitary force will become some kind of neo-Baathist organ of totalitarian control. It's much more likely to become a source of instability and intrigue within the Governing Council (and the Coalition) as well as a promising avenue for real Ba'athist totalitarians looking to infiltrate the new security apparatus.
These might seem like acceptable risks, given the jam the Coalition is in. (For a look at just how desperate that jam is, check out this op-ed from defense analyst Edward Luttwak in yesterday's New York Times.) But that assumption may look a lot less reasonable in a year or two, when the Americans are looking to hand off control to a stable Iraqi regime capable of defending itself.
The key to stabilizing Iraq is creating a legitimate government that enjoys at least some degree of popular support. And the key to that is drafting a constitution and holding popular elections as soon as possible. But coming up with a constitutional process acceptable to all the factions on the Governing Council -- and to the Shi'a religious leaders watching on the sidelines -- really is like trying to square a circle. How much harder will it become once the scramble for influence and power within the New Paramilitary Non-Model Army begins in earnest?
All this, I think, just increases the likelihood the Coalition will eventually throw up its hands in despair, abandon the quest for a constitutional process, and simply dump power into the laps of its appointed Governing Council.
At which point the construction of another Lebanon can also begin in earnest.
Of course, these paramilitary units will be so grateful to their great white masters that they would never dream of using their access for a coup...
All this, I think, just increases the likelihood the Coalition will eventually throw up its hands in despair, abandon the quest for a constitutional process, and simply dump power into the laps of its appointed Governing Council.
Which will return the favour by "privatizing" the Iraqi oil company = handing it over to American oil companies. (Maybe the French and the Russians will get something too, to keep them quiet).
What I thought you were about to say, All this, I think, just increases the likelihood the Coalition will eventually throw up its hands in despair, abandon the quest for a share in Iraqi oil (poor Poland, but what the heck were they thinking anyway), and simply dump power into the lap of the US, telling us you're on your own pal cause this really isn't working out the way you had said it would.
I feel sorry for Jerry Bremer, he dumped the Iraqi paramilitary force when he first got to Iraq but really that was the Bush administrations idea, choice and command. Bremer stated asking for more troops and money right away, sounding just like a whiney US State Governor, asking Bush for some hand-outs. Bush didn't like it and started asking Baker if the wanted the job, Baker didn't take it because too many changes in workhands looks bad-like Bush doesn't know what he is doing or something.
AND I've notice that Bremer looks fairly miserable everytime I see him on the tube. Bremer really has no control over the Bush administration lack of a plan.
And I'm like you, in that I also think this whole idea is a "promising avenue for real Ba'athist totalitarians looking to infiltrate the new security apparatus," in whatever that new security apparatus might be as it is somewhat indiscernible at present.
Bush really has no idea what he is doing and this whole mess looks like some kind of taxpayer heist operation as Bush's doesn't have a plan or certainly not much of one and so that 87.5 billion dollars looks like Bush and Cheney's early Christmas bonus.
Hey Dick, what do we do with all this money? Oh I know, lets blow it all and than ask congress for some more.
This brings to mind that one NYT editoral entitled "Why isn't Bush asking Americans to Sacrifice"
Sort of a prompt for taxpayers to give up their taxcut money during wartime article. But really we Americans are already sacrificing for Bush and his bad policies and we will no doubt continue to sacrific as time goes on.
The only people that aren't going to make any sacrifices for all these bad policies that Bush and Cheney are currently making for the US is just Bush and Cheney, and oh yes, all the elite members of Bush's cronyism camp.
Death Squads, I fear.
The NY Times is reporting that Bremer is only entertaining the idea, and even the Post's story emphasizes that the size of the new paramilitary forces would be limited to a couple of thousand men. So they haven't yet taken the plunge--only stuck their toes in the water.
Because of the danger of Lebanonization, it may indeed be a bad idea to utilize the militias, but it does seem to me that transferring authority to Iraqis is indispensable asap. The whole US effort has been distinguished by an inability or unwillingness to trust the Iraqis to do much of anything (which is, incidentally, another parallel with our old friend Vietnam, at least during the 65-68 phase). To me, the best bet (or least bad option) would be a reconstitution of the old Iraqi army, which we're paying anyway and which would provide rapidly a large source of manpower for keeping order.
That idea has been kicked around by various commentators, but I've yet to see a decent analysis of the idea. What say you, Mr. B?
Now we can set ourselves up for our very own Sepoy Revolt. Maybe we need to send this history lesson to Bremer.
History lesson
Viceroy Bremmer is being puffed in the recent Newsweek as a possible SecState in the Bush second term.
As if...
New York Time International...someone sems to have backed off that one in a hurry!
BAGHDAD, Iraq, Nov. 5 — Occupying forces here have no plans to use privately controlled Iraqi paramilitary forces to augment Iraq's army and police force, senior American and Iraqi officials said today.
The United States wants to expand Iraqi security forces as quickly as possible to relieve the burden on the 150,000 American and international troops in Iraq. But proposals to augment state-trained troops with paramilitary forces affiliated with Kurdish and Shia political parties are only beginning to be studied, according to members of Iraq's governing council and Dan Senor, a senior adviser to L. Paul Bremer III, the chief administrator of Iraq.
Junior appears to be motivated by 3 things greed, revenge, and politics. Therefore,I think this move is very political in terms of back home for Shrub. I can already hear him touting this as a "metric" of success..we are turning over more and more control of Iraq back to the Iraqi's in this case security, just like we said we would. Aren't we great. My plan is working beautifully, this is another sign of success that the terrorist despise. Then when all of it turns to crap just like with everything he does, he will blame everyone else for these problems which in this case will be the Iraqi's. Nothing is ever his fault or his administration's fault. God I am sick of this man!
. . . with the Iraqi police filling the role formerly played by Don Knotts on the old Andy Griffith Show.
Do they still keep one bullet in their shirt pockets?
Arrming Iraqi paramilitaries will either invite attacks on our own troops OR foment an Iraqi civil war. Either way a very unpleasant outcome.
To me, the best bet (or least bad option) would be a reconstitution of the old Iraqi army, which we're paying anyway and which would provide rapidly a large source of manpower for keeping order.
Well, everybody -- the State Department planning team, the CIA, the War College -- warned them not to dissolve the Army, which was the ONLY national institution not completely owned and operated by the Ba'athist. But it may be too late to unscramble the egg. Because the Army was dissolved, its barracks and other facilities were looted down to the ground.
It also looks like at least some -- maybe many -- of its Sunni officers and men have gone over to the resistance. Rounding up the others might not be so easy.
Maybe it's still the least worst option, but it reminds me of what a Russian economist said about trying to turn a centrally planned economy into a free market one:
"It's easy to turn an aquarium into fish soup; much harder to turn fish soup back into an aquarium."
Viceroy Bremmer is being puffed in the recent Newsweek as a possible SecState in the Bush second term.
I wouldn't be surprised. The guy may not be able to manage his way through a garden gate, but he has some incredible bureaucratic and media schmoozing skills -- which is all that seems to count in government any more. See my profile of Bremer's career, here.
proposals to augment state-trained troops with paramilitary forces affiliated with Kurdish and Shia political parties are only beginning to be studied, according to members of Iraq's governing council and Dan Senor, a senior adviser to L. Paul Bremer III, the chief administrator of Iraq.
Well, when Bremer and his top people say something it may not always be a lie, but that's the smart way to bet. Sounds to me like it's probably a done deal -- or close to it.
Any word from the Serbians patrolling Afghanistan?
Nov. 5 -- A possible negotiated peace deal was laid out in a heavily guarded compound in Baghdad in the days before the war, ABCNEWS has been told, but a top former Pentagon adviser says he was ordered not to pursue the deal, ABCNEWS has learned.
More excerpts:
"Although I was not enthusiastic about the offer, I was willing to meet with the Iraqis," [Richard] Perle [then the chairman of the Defense Policy Advisory Board] told ABCNEWS. "The United States government told me not to." Perle would not disclose which official or arm of the government rejected the talks
...
According to Pentagon e-mails obtained by ABCNEWS, Hage's report of the Iraqi offer was forwarded to Defense Department officials on Feb. 20, including Jaymie Durnan who, at the time, was the top aide to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. However, Pentagon officials said Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were not aware of the talks.
...
In March, the American invasion began and Rumsfeld said the United States had done everything possible to avoid war. "The American people can take comfort in knowing that their country has done everything humanly possible to avoid war and to secure Iraq's peaceful disarmament."
------
Also being covered by NYTimes, et al.
Paramilitary by day, guerilla by night
I've been waiting for this shoe to drop for so long, I couldn't figure out if the Bush administration was working an angle I was missing or they really were (are) that incompetent.
I'm still not sure.
citizin Able,
They're that incompetent. To paraphrase J. B. S. Haldane, not only is BushCo more incompetent than you know, they're more incompetent than you can know. At the risk of being redundant, the same can be said for corrupt, mendacious, cowardly and stupid. But hey, they ARE Republicans after all.
Thanks for the comment, Billmon. Incidentally, I followed the link to your old post on Bremer, and I would add one point to that. I don't doubt that he's got in spades the skills of a political opportunist, but my read is that deep down he's a warmonger, an ideologue and a fanatic. He's wanted this war (and many others) for a long time. Here are some excerpts from a Wall Street Journal op-ed on August 5, 1996, setting forth his plan of action (as I recall, the piece appeared after a flight from New York plunged mysteriously into the Atlantic):
"5. The secretary of state will send a diplomatic message to Libya's Moammar Gadhafi tonight through the Belgians informing him that within seven days he must turn over to us the Pan Am 103 bombers, close down all terrorist training camps, expel all terrorists from Libya and cease construction on his new chemical weapons plant. If he does not, Libya will bear the full brunt of American anger. The Defense Department is to move elements of the Sixth Fleet into the Gulf of Sidra, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to provide me updated lists of Libyan targets, both within 48 hours.
6. The secretary of state is to send a telegram tonight to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad noting that we will reconsider our relations with Syria unless his country immediately closes the terrorist training camps in the Bekaa Valley, closes all terrorist groups' offices in Damascus, stops aiding Hezbollah and forbids Iranian flights to resupply Hezbollah through the Damascus airport. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are to provide me updated target lists for the terrorist camps in the Bekaa Valley within 48 hours.
7. The secretary of state will alert the Iranians tonight through the Swiss that if our country gets any indication of Iranian involvement in terrorism against Americans anywhere, Iran can expect to receive the full weight of American might. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are to update target lists within Iran for my review within 30 days and prepare contingency steps to beef up our naval presence in the Persian Gulf. . .
9. The secretary of state will tell the government of Sudan tonight that it has seven days to close down all terrorist camps under its control and to deliver to the Egyptians the men who tried to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak last year. Otherwise, the Sudanese will feel our anger. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will target known Sudanese terrorist camps within 48 hours."
Oddly enough, he didn't mention Iraq in that piece, but I figure that was just an oversight.
All this suggests another point: the real key to getting an important post in this administration hasn't been skill at bureaucratic infighting, but rather proven ideological fanaticism and the tough minded commitment to force whenever and wherever.
Anyone we train and arm is just going to know how to kill us better later on.
Lebanon my ass, Congo, baby. Because you have a three way fight for the Kirkuk oil fields, potential Turkish and maybe Iranian intervention and the KDP and PUK duking it out.
While in the south, you'll have the Sadrists against Sistani. Yeah, Lebanon would be nice. The congo is more likely.
One extra INA/INC angle: Isn't there a story floating around that Chalabi actually ratted out the impending INA putsch in order to preserve his role as pretender to the Iraqi "throne"? I recall reading something along those lines on Josh Marshall's site.
If true--or even suspected--one can imagine the cold, cold revenge that will be served up if Allawi actually got a semi-functioning security ministry.
Paramilitary by day, guerilla by night
Too tiring. Paramilitary by day, lend your gear to your brother so he can guerrilla all night and hopefully get home in time with your stuff so you can paramilitary all next day.
Remember the tragic incident where our troops opened fire and killed those Iraqi police chasing a car thief? Compound it.
Doug Feith's office ignored last-minute Iraqi efforts to avoid war.
link
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff are to provide me updated target lists . . . within 48 hours"
Very interesting and revealing. Notice how this fool was prepared to start wars with Libya, Syria, Iran and Sudan SIMULTANEOUSLY?
Simply out of touch with reality . . .
Well, the loser would be Sadr if such a paramilitary were created. My guess is that they really hope that Iraqis will crack down on him heavily, causing serious civil trouble.
As long as Iraqis fight between themselves, they're not shooting at GIs. That must be the reasoning.
Not that it will exactly work this way.
as far as i can tell there are already plenty of well trained, well disciplined, well armed iraqis in the fight. the problem is they are shooting at us.
Bremer has been described as a "successful businessman", but what kind of business could it have been? In truth, isn't he just one of Henry the K's boys, a man who has never managed anything in his life?
Bremer has been described as a "successful businessman", but what kind of business could it have been? In truth, isn't he just one of Henry the K's boys, a man who has never managed anything in his life?
At the risk of being repetitive (or accused of being a Bremer stalker) here's what I wrote about him last spring:
After three years as the reluctant counter-terrorism dragon, Bremer quit and went back to licking Henry Kissinger’s boots -- this time for profit as well as fun. But after three years as COO at Kissinger Associates, he moved on to Marsh and McLennan, an insurance brokerage slash “risk management” firm.
Along the way, Bremer also grabbed a slot on the board of a company called Air Products, where he somehow managed to avoid being tarred by this corporate financial scandal (Derivatives? Hey, don’t look at me -- I’m just the anti-terrorism guy!)
A little later, Bremer added a directorship at Akzo Nobel to his income stream, where he somehow managed to avoid being tarred by this price-fixing scandal. (Anti-trust? Hey, don’t look at me – I’m just the anti-terrorism guy!)
Through most of the ’90s, Bremer remained snugly tucked away in the private sector. We can presume he made a shitload of money – not just from Air Products (a bureaucratic core competency, after all) but also as the chairman of Marsh and McLennan’s political risk practice, where he specialized in providing corporate “thought leadership” on risk-related issues.
A (blessedly brief) example:
When a massive labor strike threatens a company's ability to achieve its financial goals or even survive, Management needs to be ready to manage that challenge with a comprehensive, fully integrated Crisis Readiness program. That program should include plans, education, training exercises and more. Moreover, in order to be effective, it must be designed, developed and implemented within the context of that particular organization's "corporate governance" structure.
OK, so maybe Air Products are Bremer’s specialty.
Cheryl,
What makes you think Bremer knows what he is doing? His only qualifications for the job are that he is a self-styled "terrorism expert" who has never been to the Middle East and doesn't much like Arabs or Muslims.
"former employees of the country's security services" -- Mukhabarat Death Squads! Hooray! Everything's great. Shutupdirtyliberalhippie